Issuance and staking economics

1. TL;DR

Both Ethereum and Solana pay newly created tokens to stakers to buy security, and both face the same question: how much is enough? Ethereum’s issuance falls with the square root of total stake and has no ceiling, so a growing camp of researchers argues for actively targeting a stake ratio instead of letting it drift upward forever. Solana’s issuance instead follows a fixed, time-based disinflation schedule inherited from 2020, and a live 2026 governance fight (SIMD-550, successor to the stalled SIMD-228) is about whether to cut that schedule’s pace in half.

2. Explain it simply

Analogy

Think of a national government deciding a defense budget. It has to spend enough to deter attackers, but every extra dollar comes out of ordinary citizens’ pockets through taxes (or, here, dilution of everyone’s holdings). Ethereum’s rule is like a budget that automatically shrinks per-soldier pay as the army gets bigger, but never actually caps how big the army can get. Solana’s rule is more like a budget passed once, on a fixed multi-year taper, regardless of how big the army already is.

ELI5

When you lock up your coins to help run the network, the network prints new coins and gives them to you as a thank-you. This is a transfer from everyone who is not locking up coins to everyone who is. The tricky part is deciding how many new coins to print: too few, and not enough people bother to help secure the network; too many, and everyone who isn’t locking up coins loses value every year for no extra safety. Ethereum shrinks the reward automatically as more people join in, but never stops growing the total amount locked. Solana instead just follows a fixed printing schedule that gets slower every year, on a timer, no matter how many people are participating.

Step-by-step walkthrough

Scenario: Dev runs a solo Ethereum validator with 32 ETH, starting when total network stake is 29,000,000 ETH (the level reported in January 2024).

1. Deposit (before: 32 ETH liquid → after: 32 ETH locked). Dev sends 32 ETH to the deposit contract and starts validating. The ETH is now illiquid but earning rewards.
2. Year one passes at D = 29,000,000 ETH staked (before: 0 rewards → after: ~1.3 ETH earned). Dev earns a share of newly issued ETH for correct votes and block proposals, plus a smaller, lumpier amount from priority fees and MEV when picked to propose.
3. More validators join (before: D = 29M → after: D = 45M). Because Ethereum’s issuance shrinks as total stake rises, Dev’s annual reward for the same 32 ETH falls even though nothing Dev did changed.
4. Dev checks the alternative (before: current curve → after: a “targeted” curve). Under a curve that actively discourages stake much above ~30M ETH (proposed by researchers, not live), Dev’s yield at D = 45M would be even lower — the point is to make that growth stop, not merely slow down.

Common misconceptions

• Myth: Higher issuance always means more security. Reality: Past some deposit size, more stake buys little extra attack resistance while still diluting everyone who isn’t staking (Elowsson, 2024-01).
• Myth: Nominal yield tells you what stakers actually gain. Reality: At high staking ratios, most of the “yield” is just avoiding dilution, not real income — real yield (nominal yield minus dilution) can be far lower (casparschwa & adietrichs, 2024-02).
• Myth: Solana’s inflation is fixed forever. Reality: It is a disinflation schedule — a starting rate that declines by a fixed percentage every year toward a 1.5% floor — and that schedule itself is under active governance debate (SIMD-228, SIMD-550).
• Myth: Cutting issuance mainly hurts large staking businesses. Reality: Modeling on both chains suggests small, long-tail operators with thin margins are hit hardest, since large operators have economies of scale (Helius, 2025-03; casparschwa & adietrichs, 2024-02).

If you only remember one thing

Issuance is a security budget with no natural stopping point unless the protocol deliberately builds one in — and both Ethereum and Solana are, right now, arguing about how to build one in.

3. How it works

Ethereum: the square-root curve

Ethereum’s consensus-layer issuance yield under idealized performance is $y_i = \frac{cF}{\sqrt{D}}$ where $D$ is the total ETH deposited (staked), $F = 64$ is the protocol’s “base reward factor,” and $c \approx 2.6$ is a constant absorbing the per-epoch reward math (Elowsson, ethresear.ch 18448, 2024-01). Because $y_i$ falls with $1/\sqrt{D}$, doubling the amount staked only reduces the per-validator yield by about 29%, not 50% — issuance is deliberately “sticky.” Stakers also receive a second component, the yield from realized extractable value (REV, priority fees plus MEV net of what block builders keep): $y_v = \frac{V}{D}$ where $V$ is aggregate yearly REV (about 300,000 ETH per year as of 2024-01, per Elowsson, citing Flashbots data). Total staking yield is $y = y_i + y_v$. Because $y_v$ falls with $1/D$ rather than $1/\sqrt{D}$, REV becomes proportionally less important to the reward mix as $D$ grows, so issuance keeps its grip on validator incentives even at very high stake levels — which is exactly the property that lets low-issuance proposals threaten consensus incentives (see §6).

Crucially, the current curve has a floor but no ceiling: as $D \to \infty$, $y_i \to 0$ but never goes negative, so nothing in the protocol itself stops the entire circulating supply from eventually being staked. Researchers (casparschwa & adietrichs, ethresear.ch 18751, 2024-02) argue Ethereum should instead adopt stake-ratio targeting: a curve that pays generously at low stake, but turns issuance toward zero (or below) past a target range, so that an equilibrium staking ratio — not an unbounded one — emerges. One evaluated family of alternative curves adds a term that grows with $D$ to the denominator, e.g. $y_i = \dfrac{cF}{\sqrt{D}+kD}$, which behaves like the current curve at low $D$ but asymptotically caps yearly issuance at $cF/k$ regardless of how much more ETH gets staked (Elowsson, 2024-01, §5.1).

Solana: fixed disinflation, with a market-based challenger

Solana’s live schedule is purely time-based: issuance starts at 8% annual inflation and falls by a fixed 15% relative rate every year (i.e., next year’s rate = this year’s rate × 0.85) until it reaches a 1.5% floor (Helius, “SIMD-228: A Critical Analysis”, n.d.). As of June 2026 (epoch 980) the rate stood at 3.82% — behind the originally intended calendar schedule, because Solana’s actual epochs ran longer than the ~2-day target for most of 2021–2023 (Helius, “SIMD-550,” 2026). Two competing reform proposals have followed:

• SIMD-228 (“Market-Based Emission Mechanism,” Jain/Kankani/Resnick) would replace the fixed schedule with a formula that reacts to the staking ratio $s$ (fraction of SOL staked): $i(s) = r\left(1 - \sqrt{s} + c\cdot\max\!\left(1-\sqrt{2s},\,0\right)\right)$ where $r$ is the time-decaying static rate and $c \approx 3.146$ (Helius, “SIMD-228,” n.d.). This pushes inflation down when staking is high (strong security signal) and up when staking is low, aiming for the “minimum necessary amount” of issuance. It never reached activation and its 2025 successor was closed for inactivity.
• SIMD-550 (“Double Disinflation,” a 2026 proposal) instead just doubles the existing decay rate, from -15%/year to -30%/year, reaching the 1.5% floor around H1 2029 rather than H1 2032 (Helius, 2026). Its appeal, per Helius’s analysis, is that it needs no new formula — “a clean Schelling point” that is easy to model and communicate, unlike SIMD-228’s contested constant $c$.

Both curves face the same tension

Whether tuned by an ethresear.ch curve or a SIMD, cutting issuance too aggressively risks the same failure mode: the reward for actually doing the job (attesting on Ethereum, voting on Solana) shrinks toward the reward for merely holding stake, weakening the incentive to perform duties correctly (Elowsson, 2024-01, §3; Helius, “SIMD-228,” n.d.).

4. Worked numeric example

Ethereum, matching §2. With $c=2.6$, $F=64$, and $D = 29{,}000{,}000$ ETH (2024-01 level): $y_i = 2.6 \times 64 / \sqrt{29{,}000{,}000} = 166.4/5385.2 \approx 3.09\%$. With $V \approx 300{,}000$ ETH/year: $y_v = 300{,}000/29{,}000{,}000 \approx 1.03\%$. Total $y \approx 4.12\%$. Dev’s 32 ETH earns roughly $32 \times 0.0309 \approx 0.99$ ETH from issuance and $32 \times 0.0103 \approx 0.33$ ETH from REV on average — about 1.32 ETH for the year, though the REV portion is highly skewed (median block REV around 0.045 ETH, versus a mean of about 0.12 ETH, because a few blocks carry outsized MEV; Elowsson, 2024-01, §4.1).

Now let $D$ grow to 45,000,000 ETH: $y_i = 166.4/\sqrt{45{,}000{,}000} = 166.4/6708.2 \approx 2.48\%$; $y_v = 300{,}000/45{,}000{,}000 \approx 0.67\%$; total $y \approx 3.15\%$. Dev’s same 32 ETH now earns about $32\times(0.0248+0.0067) \approx 1.01$ ETH — a roughly 24% cut in annual reward for identical work, purely from other people joining. This is the dynamic that motivates targeting: under a curve engineered to discourage growth much past ~30M ETH, the drop at D = 45M would be sharper still, by design.

Solana analogue. Plug two staking ratios into the SIMD-228 formula with $c \approx 3.146$ and a static rate $r = 4.68\%$ (its reference starting point): at $s=0.63$ (roughly Solana’s actual 2025 staking ratio), $i(0.63) = 0.0468\times(1-\sqrt{0.63}) \approx 0.0468\times0.206 \approx 0.96\%$ — sharply below the fixed schedule’s rate at the time. At $s=0.35$, the second term switches on ($2s=0.70<1$): $i(0.35)=0.0468\times(1-\sqrt{0.35}+3.146\times(1-\sqrt{0.70})) \approx 0.0468\times(0.408+3.146\times0.163) \approx 0.0468\times0.921 \approx 4.31\%$ — well above the fixed schedule, illustrating why Helius’s simulations found SIMD-228 “aggressive below 50% staking” (Helius, “SIMD-228,” n.d.).

5. Where it’s used

Ethereum

• Consensus-layer issuance — every attesting and proposing validator’s reward is a direct function of $D$ under the curve above; it is the largest single driver of ETH’s net supply change. ethresear.ch/t/18448
• Liquid staking tokens — because SSP (staking service provider) supply curves are flatter than solo-staker supply curves, LSTs are the main channel through which new stake enters at falling yields (casparschwa & adietrichs, 2024-02). See /staking/liquid-staking-tokens/.
• EIP-7514 and related churn limits — protocol changes already throttle how fast new stake can enter, a milder tool than changing the curve itself.

Solana

• Validator inflation commission — every validator’s largest structural revenue line is a cut of the inflation paid to its delegators (Helius, “Solana Validator Economics: A Primer,” n.d.).
• SIMD-0123 (Block Revenue Sharing) — a complementary proposal letting validators route a share of block revenue (not just inflation) to delegators automatically on-chain. SIMD-0123
• Solana Foundation Delegation Program (SFDP) — subsidizes voting costs and matches external stake for smaller validators, explicitly to offset the economics discussed here.

6. Risks, attacks, and incidents

• Discouragement attacks (theoretical). Buterin’s original analysis of $y_i = cFD^{-p}$ found that $p > 0.5$ (steeper-than-current issuance decay) could make it profitable to push other validators out by flooding the market with stake, then de-staking once yield rises again for the remainder. Elowsson’s follow-up notes that once an attacker’s own need to de-stake is modeled, the threshold moves closer to $p>1$, but the risk motivates caution in how aggressively any new curve should fall (ethresear.ch 18448, 2024-01, §5.4).
• Consensus-incentive breakdown at very low issuance. If the attester’s share of yield ($y_a/y$) falls too far — Elowsson suggests below one-third as an “unhealthy” guideline — honest attestation stops paying enough to matter relative to simply avoiding slashing, and timing games and short reorgs become comparatively more attractive (ethresear.ch 18448, 2024-01, §3).
• LST winner-take-most dynamics from over-issuance. casparschwa & adietrichs calculate that at a hypothetical 90% Ethereum staking ratio with 2% yield and 90% liquid-staked, roughly 0.16% of ETH’s market cap — about 200,000 ETH (~$530M at the cited price, 2024-02) — would flow to staking-service-provider fees every year, a de facto tax on all ETH holders (ethresear.ch 18751, 2024-02).
• Modeled validator-set contraction on Solana. Helius’s simulations of SIMD-228 found the change “will likely lead to a contraction in the validator set, though this effect is expected to be limited (3.4% under the high-stake scenario)” (Helius, “SIMD-228,” n.d.). Its 2026 successor SIMD-550 modeled 2 validators becoming unprofitable in year one, 13 in year two, and 30 in year three of a doubled disinflation rate (Helius, “SIMD-550,” 2026).
• Real incident: Solana Foundation Delegation Program removals, June 2025 (as of 2025-06). Multiple validators were forcibly removed from the SFDP after being found running private-mempool sandwich-attack arrangements — a reminder that subsidized, low-margin validator economics create pressure toward off-protocol side deals for revenue (Helius, “The Solana Foundation Delegation Program & the Challenges Facing Long-tail Validators,” n.d., discussing the June 2025 removals). One affected validator, Chainflow, stated it “remain[s] heavily dependent on SFDP delegation to continue operating” despite being a net ecosystem contributor — illustrating how thin the profitability margin already is for long-tail operators (Helius, “SIMD-228,” n.d., quoting Chainflow, 2025-03).

7. Open problems

• What is the “right” staking ratio? casparschwa & adietrichs explicitly decline to specify a target range, calling it a question for broader community discussion, not a technical one (ethresear.ch 18751, 2024-02).
• How to keep consensus incentives correct at near-zero issuance? Both authors point to MEV-capture mechanisms (Execution Tickets, MEV burn) or an explicit validator fee as prerequisites for pushing yield very low without breaking attester incentives (ethresear.ch 18751, 2024-02, “Open Questions”).
• Is SIMD-228’s complexity worth it versus SIMD-550’s simplicity? Helius frames this as the live 2026 debate: a responsive formula that “confuse[s] the average layperson” versus a single-parameter change that is “the simplest possible protocol change that delivers a meaningful reduction in inflation” (Helius, “SIMD-550,” 2026).
• How much does restaked ETH actually contribute to Ethereum’s security? A contested side-debate (MicahZoltu vs. barnabe, in the comments on ethresear.ch 18751, 2024-02) over whether restaked stake should be treated as “attacker-controlled” for the purposes of these equilibrium models. See /staking/restaking/.

8. Ethereum vs Solana

Aspect	Ethereum	Solana
Issuance rule	$y_i = cF/\sqrt{D}$, no ceiling	Fixed disinflation: 8% → -15%/yr → 1.5% floor
Reform proposal	Stake-ratio targeting curves (research stage)	SIMD-550 doubles disinflation to -30%/yr (2026 vote)
Rejected/stalled alternative	Vitalik’s negative-yield “economic capping” curve	SIMD-228 market-based formula (stalled, superseded)
Non-issuance yield	REV (priority fees + MEV), $y_v = V/D$	Block rewards (base + priority fees) and Jito MEV tips
Governance mechanism	Client-team/community rough consensus, hard fork	On-chain-adjacent SIMD proposal + validator stake-weighted feature-gate activation

Ethereum’s problem is structural: a curve with no ceiling, addressed only by voluntary research proposals that have not yet shipped. Solana’s problem is closer to calibration: a schedule everyone agrees is roughly right in direction, contested mainly on how fast and by what formula to move. Both, as of 2026, remain live governance questions rather than settled protocol facts.

9. Reference doc

The reference

Endgame Staking Economics: A Case for Targeting — Ansgar Dietrichs and Caspar Schwarz-Schilling, 22 February 2024. ethresear.ch/t/18751

Summary of the reference

The post opens by observing that Ethereum’s staking ratio has only ever risen — about 30M of 120M ETH staked by early 2024 — and argues this trend will continue because liquid staking tokens (LSTs) flatten the supply curve for new stake over time. It frames the demand side first: issuance yield $y_i = cF/\sqrt{ETH\ Staked}$ plus MEV yield form a “demand curve for stake” that guarantees a minimum staking level (very high rewards at low participation) but places no ceiling on the maximum. The supply side is then split into solo stakers, whose costs are heterogeneous and largely fixed upfront, and staking service providers (SSPs), whose costs are homogeneous and fall over time as LSTs gain “money-ness” through DeFi integration, better governance, and perceived too-big-to-fail status. Because the SSP supply curve is flatter, the authors argue continued net inflows to staking are likely to keep coming through LSTs specifically.

The post’s core argument is that a high staking ratio has real costs, even though Ethereum is already “arguably sufficiently secure” at current levels: (1) LSTs exhibit winner-take-most network effects that risk one liquid staking token becoming a systemically important, non-neutral money for the network; (2) more issuance means more dilution, which is a “de facto tax” that non-stakers cannot avoid without accepting SSP counterparty risk; and (3) solo staking becomes progressively less competitive as staking ratios rise, because SSPs benefit from economies of scale that solo stakers structurally cannot access. The authors distinguish nominal from real (dilution-adjusted) yield throughout, showing that at high staking ratios nearly all of the incentive to stake becomes “dilution protection” rather than genuine income — a composition change that, they argue, still works as an incentive but produces a worse outcome for everyone.

The proposed fix is stake-ratio targeting: an issuance curve that pays well below some threshold and pushes issuance toward zero or negative above it, sketched as a curve close to one Vitalik Buterin outlined for “economic capping of total deposits.” The post closes with six open questions — the desirable target range, how to pick a specific curve, incentive compatibility at near-zero issuance, removing MEV-driven reward volatility, expressing the target as a ratio rather than a fixed ETH amount, and how to transition if the target range has already been overshot — and links to a companion, more immediately actionable proposal for adjusting the issuance curve in the Electra hard fork.

Key quotes

“Today, the issuance yield does not ensure a limit to the amount that can be staked profitably.” (Introduction, tl;dr)

“An outcome with most of the incentive to stake coming from dilution protection is undesirable for both stakers and ETH holders.” (§ Discussion)

“Ethereum’s future staking ratio is uncertain; however, the absence of control over maximum staking levels warrants a proactive approach in determining optimal levels.” (§ Discussion)

“The main advantage of targeting is that it prevents all of the negative aspects of a high staking ratio regime enumerated in the section above.” (§ Implications of Targeting)

How to read the original

Background needed: the shape of Ethereum’s current issuance curve ($y_i=cF/\sqrt{D}$) and the concept of a liquid staking token. Skip the footnotes on first pass; they mostly caveat simplifying assumptions (constant MEV, ignoring EIP-1559 burn) that don’t change the argument. The hardest section is “Real Yield,” which asks the reader to hold two yield curves in mind simultaneously (nominal for stakers, and an implicit negative one for non-stakers from dilution) — it helps to fix a single staking ratio and compute both numbers by hand, as this page’s §4 does for a related scenario.

What changed since

• The companion Electra proposal referenced in the post was not adopted as specified; Ethereum’s issuance curve remained materially unchanged through 2026, keeping stake-ratio targeting a research proposal rather than shipped code.
• Anders Elowsson’s “Properties of issuance level” (ethresear.ch 18448, 2024-01), published one week earlier, supplies the quantitative variability analysis (solo-staker reward dispersion, attester-share thresholds) that this post’s targeting argument leans on informally.
• On Solana, the same “should issuance react to participation” question resurfaced independently as SIMD-228 (2025) and its 2026 successor SIMD-550, discussed in §3 above.

Secondary references

1. Anders Elowsson, “Properties of issuance level: consensus incentives and variability across potential reward curves” (ethresear.ch 18448, 2024-01) — read if you want the underlying math and simulation methodology behind the targeting argument.
2. Helius, “SIMD-228: A Critical Analysis” (n.d.) — read for the Solana-side equivalent debate, including validator-set profitability modeling.
3. Helius, “SIMD-550: Why Solana Should Double Disinflation” (2026) — read for the live 2026 Solana proposal and its modeled effects on supply, yield, and validator profitability.
4. Vitalik Buterin, “Discouragement attacks” (paper linked from ethresear.ch 18448) — read for the original game-theoretic bound on how steeply issuance can fall before de-staking attacks become profitable.

The reference (Solana)

SIMD-228: A Critical Analysis — Helius, referencing SIMD-228 authors Tushar Jain, Vishal Kankani (Multicoin Capital), and Max Resnick (Anza), n.d. (internal evidence places publication around March 2025). helius.dev/blog/simd-228

Summary of the reference (Solana)

Helius opens by describing Solana’s existing fixed disinflation schedule (8% initial rate, -15%/year, 1.5% floor, then at roughly 4.68% at time of writing) and introduces SIMD-228’s proposed replacement: a formula $i(s) = r(1-\sqrt{s}+c\cdot\max(1-\sqrt{2s},0))$ that ties inflation to the staking ratio $s$, with a 50-epoch linear interpolation to avoid a sharp transition. The piece walks through four rejected alternative designs (a community-set fixed rate, a MEV-targeted yield, a proportional controller, and a single-term version of the formula) and explains why each was judged worse than the two-term design actually proposed.

The bulk of the article is original modeling: a Python simulation of SIMD-228 across best-, median-, and worst-case staking scenarios (with simulated “shocks” and unstaking “penalties”), and a separate validator-set economics model built from real mainnet data (Blockworks dashboards, Stakewiz API) classifying validators as profitable, break-even, or unprofitable under different staking-rate scenarios. Headline findings: SIMD-228 stabilizes inflation and yield in typical scenarios but can spike inflation further in a low-stake, high-penalty worst case; roughly half of all validators already charge a zero commission on inflation, so the proposal’s direct economic impact is concentrated on the other half; and the modeled validator-set contraction is real but modest (up to 3.4% under a high-staking scenario). The piece then lays out arguments for and against the proposal — “leaky bucket” tax losses from staking-reward taxation, price-signal distortion from persistent inflation, and Cosmos-style capital inefficiency on one side; voting-cost burdens on small validators, unmeasured MEV dependence, and formula complexity on the other — before noting the eventual extension of the transition period from 10 to 50 epochs in response to community pushback.

Key quotes (Solana)

“SIMD-228 seeks to replace this with a formula that adjusts inflation dynamically based on the staking rate.” (§ What Is SIMD-228?)

“The model suggests that the introduction of the SIMD-228 inflation curve will likely lead to a contraction in the validator set, though this effect is expected to be limited (3.4% under the high-stake scenario).” (§ Validator Set Economics Modeling Observations)

“647 out of 1,316 validators (49%) have a staking rewards commission rate of zero, meaning changes in inflation will have little direct impact on their economic viability.” (§ Actionable Insights)

“Ideally, inflation should be determined by the demand curve for SOL staking yield rather than arbitrary human decisions.” (§ Actionable Insights)

How to read the original

Background needed: Solana’s basic validator-reward structure (inflation commission, block rewards, MEV tips) — see §3/§5 above. Skip the code-structure walkthrough (function-by-function description of the simulation) on a first pass; the scenario tables and the “Validator Set Model Assumptions” section carry the substantive content. The hardest part to parse is the interaction between the two rejected-alternative critiques and the final formula’s two terms — it helps to note that the first term (in $\sqrt{s}$) does the “reduce inflation as staking rises” work, while the second term (active only below 50% staking) is a floor-protection patch for the edge case where the first term alone would let inflation fall too low at low staking rates.

What changed since

• SIMD-228 itself stalled and its direct 2025 successor, SIMD-411, was closed due to inactivity while tooling for staker (not just validator) governance participation was built.
• SIMD-550 (2026) replaced the market-based-formula approach entirely with a simple doubling of the disinflation rate, explicitly designed to avoid the “bikeshedding” that stalled SIMD-228 (Helius, “SIMD-550,” 2026).
• As of June 2026, Solana’s actual inflation rate (3.82%) remained below where the original fixed schedule intended, because of historically longer-than-target epoch durations — a separate, unrelated factor from either reform proposal (Helius, “SIMD-550,” 2026).

Secondary references (Solana)

1. Helius, “SIMD-550: Why Solana Should Double Disinflation” (2026) — read for the proposal that superseded SIMD-228 in practice.
2. Helius, “Solana Validator Economics: A Primer” (n.d.) — read first if you need the cost/revenue basics before the policy debate.
3. SIMD-0123, “Block Revenue Sharing” (Solana Improvement Documents) — read for the complementary on-chain mechanism for passing block revenue, not just inflation, to delegators.

10. Sources

• Properties of issuance level: consensus incentives and variability across potential reward curves — Anders Elowsson — 2024-01-24 — https://ethresear.ch/t/properties-of-issuance-level-consensus-incentives-and-variability-across-potential-reward-curves/18448
• Endgame Staking Economics: A Case for Targeting — Ansgar Dietrichs, Caspar Schwarz-Schilling — 2024-02-22 — https://ethresear.ch/t/endgame-staking-economics-a-case-for-targeting/18751
• SIMD-228: A Critical Analysis — Helius — n.d. (referenced events dated 2025-03) — https://www.helius.dev/blog/simd-228
• SIMD-550: Why Solana Should Double Disinflation — Helius — 2026 — https://www.helius.dev/blog/simd-550-solana-disinflation
• Solana Validator Economics: A Primer — Helius — n.d. — https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-validator-economics-a-primer
• The Solana Foundation Delegation Program & the Challenges Facing Long-tail Validators — Helius — n.d. — https://www.helius.dev/blog/solana-foundation-delegation-program-sfdp
• SIMD-0123: Block Revenue Sharing — Justin Starry (Anza), Solana Improvement Documents — created 2024-03-10 — https://github.com/solana-foundation/solana-improvement-documents/blob/main/proposals/0123-block-revenue-distribution.md